Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die dreiwertige Logik der Sprache" verfügbar.

Production of Presence is a comprehensive version of the thinking of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, one of the most consistently original literary scholars writing today. It offers a personalized account of some of the central theoretical movements in literary studies and in the humanities over the past thirty years, together with an equally personal view of a possible future. Based on this assessment of the past and the future of literary studies and the humanities, the book develops the provocative thesis (...) that, through their exclusive dedication to interpretation, i.e. to the reconstruction and attribution of meaning, the humanities have become incapable of addressing a dimension in all cultural phenomena that is as important as the dimension of meaning. Interpretation alone cannot do justice to the dimension of "presence," a dimension in which cultural phenomena and cultural events become tangible and have an impact on our senses and our bodies. Production of Presence is a passionate plea for a rethinking and a reshaping of the intellectual practice within the humanities. (shrink)

The discourse on climate politics so far is an expert and elitist discourse in which peoples, societies, citizens, workers, voters and their interests, views and voices are very much neglected. So, in order to turn climate change politics from its head onto its feet you have to take sociology into account. There is an important background assumption which shares in the general ignorance concerning environmental issues and, paradoxically, this is in corporated in the specialism of environmental sociology itself — this (...) is the category of ‘the environment’. If ‘the environment’ only includes everything which is not human, not social, then the concept is sociologically empty. If the concept includes human action and society, then it is scientifically mistaken and politically suicidal. (shrink)

Berger, U., Total sets and objects in domain theory, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 60 91-117. Total sets and objects generalizing total functions are introduced into the theory of effective domains of Scott and Ersov. Using these notions Kreisel's Density Theorem and the Theorem of Kreisel-Lacombe-Shoenfield are generalized. As an immediate consequence we obtain the well-known continuity of computable functions on the constructive reals as well as a domain-theoretic characterization of the Heriditarily Effective Operations.

We show how to extract effective bounds Φ for $\bigwedge u^1 \bigwedge v \leq_\gamma tu \bigvee w^\eta G_0$ -sentences which depend on u only (i.e. $\bigwedge u \bigwedge v \leq_\gamma tu \bigvee w \leq_\eta \Phi uG_0$ ) from arithmetical proofs which use analytical assumptions of the form \begin{equation*}\tag{*}\bigwedge x^\delta\bigvee y \leq_\rho sx \bigwedge z^\tau F_0\end{equation*} (γ, δ, ρ, and τ are arbitrary finite types, η ≤ 2, G0 and F0 are quantifier-free, and s and t are closed terms). If τ (...) ≤ 2, (*) can be weakened to $\bigwedge x^\delta, z^\tau\bigvee y \leq_\rho sx \bigwedge \tilde{z} \leq_\tau z F_0$ . This is used to establish new conservation results about weak König's lemma. Applications to proofs in classical analysis, especially uniqueness proofs in approximation theory, will be given in subsequent papers. (shrink)

In this article I want to outline an argument for a New Critical Theory with a cosmopolitan intent. Its main purpose is to undermine one of the most powerful beliefs of our time concerning society and politics. This belief is the notion that “modern society” and “modern politics” are to be understood as society and politics organized around the nation‐state, equating society with the national imagination of society. There are two aspects to this body of beliefs: what I call the (...) “national perspective” of social actors, and the “methodological nationalism” of scientific observers. The distinction between these two perspectives is important because there is no logical co‐implication between them, only an interconnected genesis and history. (shrink)

Kohlenbach, U., Effective moduli from ineffective uniqueness proofs. An unwinding of de La Vallée Poussin's proof for Chebycheff approximation, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 64 27–94.We consider uniqueness theorems in classical analysis having the form u ε U, v1, v2 ε Vu = 0 = G→v 1 = v2), where U, V are complete separable metric spaces, Vu is compact in V and G:U x V → is a constructive function.If is proved by arithmetical means from analytical assumptions x (...) εXy ε Yx z ε Z = 0) only , then we can extract from the proof of → an effective modulus of uniqueness, which depends on u, k but not on v1,v2, i.e., u ε U, v1, v2 ε Vu, k εG, G 2-φuk→dv2-itk). Such a modulus φ can e.g. be used to give a finite algorithm which computes the zero of G on Vu with prescribed precision if it exists classically.The extraction of φ uses a proof-theoretic combination of functional interpretation and pointwise majorization. If the proof of → uses only simple instances of induction, then φ is a simple mathematical operation. (shrink)

This paper develops a formal framework to model a process in which the formation of individual opinions is embedded in a deliberative exchange with others. The paper opts for a low-resolution modeling approach and abstracts away from most of the details of the social-epistemic process. Taking a bird's eye view allows us to analyze the chances for the truth to be found and broadly accepted under conditions of cognitive division of labour combined with a social exchange process. Cognitive division of (...) labour means that only some individuals are active truth seekers, possibly with different capacities. Both mathematical tools and computer simulations are used to investigate the model. As an analytical result, the Funnel Theorem states that under rather weak conditions on the social process, a consensus on the truth will be reached if all individuals possess an arbitrarily small capacity to go for the truth. The Leading the pack Theorem states that under certain conditions even a single truth seeker may lead all individuals to the truth. Systematic simulations analyze how close agents can get to the truth depending upon the frequency of truth seekers, their capacities as truth seekers, the position of the truth (more to the extreme or more in the centre of an opinion space), and the willingness to take into account the opinions of others when exchanging and updating opinions. (shrink)

The paper presents a refined method of extracting reasonable and sometimes unexpected programs from classical proofs of formulas of the form ∀x∃yB . We also generalize previously known results, since B no longer needs to be quantifier-free, but only has to belong to a strictly larger class of so-called “goal formulas”. Furthermore we allow unproven lemmas D in the proof of ∀x∃yB , where D is a so-called “definite” formula.

Was Natur für uns ist und welche Bereiche unserer Umwelt als natürlich erfahren werden, scheint sich einer prinzipiellen Bestimmung zu entziehen. Auch ist weitgehend unklar, worauf sich der verantwortliche Umgang "des" Menschen mit "der" Natur beziehen soll? Etwa auf die Erhaltung des Status quo der Natur oder auf die maßvolle Steuerung des Wandels der Natur? Ist in den gegenwärtigen umweltpolitischen und den Naturschutz betreffenden Überlegungen tatsächlich "die" Natur der Referenzrahmen verantwortlichen Handelns oder geht es uns vor allem um die Erhaltung (...) eines nützlichen Zustands für uns und nachfolgende Generationen? Die Autorinnen und Autoren des Bandes ziehen die Gewissheiten unseres theoretischen und praktischen Umgangs mit der Natur in Frage und suchen nach neuen Perspektiven. -/- Unter den Stichworten Objektive Natur (I.), Natur als Resonanzraum (II.), Natur als Ressource und Wert (III.), Natur als natürliche Umwelt (IV.), Künstliche Natur (V.), Vergesellschaftete Natur (VI.) und Verantwortete Natur (VII.) sind Beiträge der Philosophinnen Heike Baranzke und Christine Zunke sowie der Philosophen Michael Großheim, Michael Hauskeller, Kristian Köchy, Ulrich Krohs und Gregor Schiemann versammelt. Interdisziplinäre Herausforderungen zur Thematik werden in den Studien von Jörn Ahrens (Kultursoziologie), Karl-Werner Brand (Umwelt- und Nachhaltigkeitsforschung), Hans Diefenbacher (Wirtschaftswissenschaften), Thomas Fuchs (Psychiatrie), Ulrich Gebhard (Erziehungswissenschaften), Thomas Kirchhoff (Ökologie), Dörte Martens/ Nicole Bauer (Umweltpsychologie), Hartmut Rosa (Soziologie), Heinrich Spanier (Umweltschutz), Vera Tekken/ Josef Settele (Umweltforschung), Frank Uekötter (Umweltgeschichte) und Michael Wink (Biologie) deutlich herausgearbeitet. Die Beiträge der Theologen Dirk Evers und Thorsten Moos runden den Band ab. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is this: Instead of presenting a provisional and necessarily insufficient characterization of what mathematical physics is, I will ask the reader to take it just as that, what he or she thinks or believes it is, yet to be prepared to revise his opinion in the light of what I am going to tell. Because this is precisely, what I intend to do. I will challenge some of the received or standard views about mathematical physics (...) and replace them by a more sophisticated picture, which takes into account the methodological and philosophical roots of mathematical physics in Göttingen. (shrink)

The concept of the national is often perceived, both in public and academic discourse as the central obstacle for the realization of cosmopolitan orientations. Consequently, debates about the nation tend to revolve around its persistence or its demise. We depart from this either-or perspective by investigating the formation of the ‘cosmopolitan nation’ as a facet of world risk society. Modern collectivities are increasingly preoccupied with debating, preventing and managing risks. However, unlike earlier manifestations of risk characterized by daring actions or (...) predictability models, global risks can no longer be calculated or forecast. Accordingly, more influence accrues to the perception of risk, largely constructed by media representations. Cosmopolitanized risk collectivities are engendered through the anticipation of endangered futures which are, for the most part, communicated through an increasingly global media scape. While global media events produce shared exposure, risk conceptions retain distinctive political-cultural features as their respective meanings are prefigured by path-dependent pasts. Nevertheless, the promulgation of risk societies, we argue, results in a reimagination of nationhood which takes place in the context of: global norms (e.g. human rights); globalized markets; transnational migrations; global generations and their embeddedness in civil society movements; and the local interpenetration of world religions to name but a few of the global backdrops shaping new associational intersections. We develop our argument in four interrelated steps. Contrary to essentialized notions of nationalism or universal versions of cosmopolitanism, we address the cosmopolitan reconfiguration of nationhood by differentiating between presumptions of thick belonging and the actual proliferation of cosmopolitan affiliations. In a second step we overcome the territorial fixation of the social sciences by shifting our attention to temporal dimensions, with a particular focus on competing conceptions of the future. In a third step we demonstrate how these cosmopolitan transformations of nationhood are taking place in the context of a world risk society regime that marshals a set of cosmopolitan imperatives situating the global other in our midst. In a fourth step we illustrate these developments by exploring how the mediatization of risk, and concomitant notions of the future, contribute to the reimagination of cosmopolitan risk collectivities. (shrink)

The article critically analyses the gaps and the analytical potential in Jürgen Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere concerning corporate discourses and debates. It is shown that Habermas only analyses the field of work in abstract terms, neglecting in particular corporate public spheres. In contrast, corporate public spheres are developed as an analytical concept, expressed by companies in the form of institutionalized co-determination, situationally granted opportunities for participation and self-willed public spheres of workers. These three fields are discussed (...) using empirical examples. It is shown that corporate public spheres are eroded by precarization and instrumentalized by management. Furthermore, digitalization is working towards a comprehensive algorithmic control of corporate public spheres by companies, but also towards new autonomous communication networks that establish proletarian public spheres, so that both refeudalization and revitalization of corporate public spheres can be observed. (shrink)

We present an extension of Heyting arithmetic in finite types called Uniform Heyting Arithmetic that allows for the extraction of optimized programs from constructive and classical proofs. The system has two sorts of first-order quantifiers: ordinary quantifiers governed by the usual rules, and uniform quantifiers subject to stronger variable conditions expressing roughly that the quantified object is not computationally used in the proof. We combine a Kripke-style Friedman/Dragalin translation which is inspired by work of Coquand and Hofmann and a variant (...) of the refined A-translation due to Buchholz, Schwichtenberg and the author to extract programs from a rather large class of classical first-order proofs while keeping explicit control over the levels of recursion and the decision procedures for predicates used in the extracted program. (shrink)

This paper describes formalizations of Tait's normalization proof for the simply typed λ-calculus in the proof assistants Minlog, Coq and Isabelle/HOL. From the formal proofs programs are machine-extracted that implement variants of the well-known normalization-by-evaluation algorithm. The case study is used to test and compare the program extraction machineries of the three proof assistants in a non-trivial setting.

In this paper, we present another case study in the general project of proof mining which means the logical analysis of prima facie non-effective proofs with the aim of extracting new computationally relevant data. We use techniques based on monotone functional interpretation developed in Kohlenbach , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 225–260) to analyze Cheney's simplification 189) of Jackson's original proof 320) of the uniqueness of the best L1-approximation of continuous functions fC[0,1] by polynomials pPn of degree n. Cheney's (...) proof is non-effective in the sense that it is based on classical logic and on the non-computational principle WKL . The result of our analysis provides the first effective uniform modulus of uniqueness . Moreover, the extracted modulus has the optimal ε-dependency as follows from Kroó 331). The paper also describes how the uniform modulus of uniqueness can be used to compute the best L1-approximations of a fixed fC[0,1] with arbitrary precision. The second author uses this result to give a complexity upper bound on the computation of the best L1-approximation in Oliva 66–77). (shrink)

What, if anything, is the correlation between the specialized or technical ideas of the philosopher and the rest of his existence? His everyday life outside his philosophical role. In the specialized reality and reality constitution, when employing the discourse and discipline of philosophy, the philosopher subscribe to many things in an explicit manner and he employs a number of implicit things and assumptions that are not stated explicitly. These things concern the different branches, areas and domains of the philosophical discourse, (...) for example metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, ontology, cognition, consciousness, mind, perception, thinking, etc. Is there a relation between these technical 'beliefs' of the philosopher and other, not philosophical areas of his existence? Does and can all of his non-philosophical existence reflect his philosophical beliefs, statements and expressions? Is it possible that the everyday existence or life world of the philosopher can resemble, confirm and express his philosophical ideas? If this is not the case, what are the factors that are involved in such discrepancies? Do they imply a lack of integrity, of wholeness of integration on behalf of the philosopher? What are the causes of such an illogical or surprising lack of compatibility or similarity between these sets of two or more facts? What are the things that we can look for in such a lack of compatibility – things such as the following? - inconsistency, difference, disparity, variance, variation, deviation, divergence, -/- disagreement, dissimilarity, dissimilitude, mismatch, lack of similarity, contrariety, contradictoriness, disaccord, discordance, incongruity, -/- lack of congruence, incompatibility, irreconcilability, conflict, opposition? -/- I illustrate the above by means of four examples. 1 Let us assume that the embodied human person consists of both voluntary and involuntary processes and activities. Do the philosophy of an individual reflect or express these activities or is it completely or partially unrelated to them? Do the voluntary processes and activities or the voluntary aspects of perception, cognition, brain processes and other activities resemble or express the philosophy of a thinker? 2 Some thinkers are seriously concerned about the importance of discourse and dialogue and the equality of all those involved. We find their concern about the ideal discourse and dialogue described in their written work and talks, but to what an extend do their own discursive and dialogical actions and behaviour reflect the ideal situation they preach? 3 Ethics and morality can be find in and are emphasized in all sorts of disciplines, of course they are major subjects in providing ways to live off for philosophers and we even find institutions devoted to their teaching and investigation. Do the lives, the lived morality and ethics of those individuals who preach the ideals of ethics or ethical ideals reflect the ideals they preach and that provides them with ways to earn a living? Or, is it the case that morality and ethics are merely faked by those individuals living off their preaching of ethics? And, that they merely employ the values, norms, customs and attitudes of a culture, sub-culture, community, group or another social grouping? In other words are the preachers of ethics really more ethical than the rest of the community and society? 4 When the philosopher expresses his ideas by means of all sorts of philosophical tools he is aware of the fact that he employs them, or at least aware of some of them being intentionally employed by him while he is unaware of others that he employs. Do the tools the philosopher employs to theorize (identify problems, the nature of the questions he asks, the nature of his ways of questioning, the assumptions he makes, the forming and testing of hypotheses, the making of generalizations, etc) or philosophize (perceive things, think, think about things, reason, argumentation etc) resemble what he beliefs, asserts and says about thinking, perception, cognition, understanding, subjects, objects, relationships between subjects and objects and other features and processes of epistemology? In short – does the lived philosophy, ontology, epistemology, ethics etc of the philosopher resemble, represent, confirm, substantiate, back, endorse, support, authenticate and corroborate the ideas, assertions and speculations that are expressed by the statements his philosophy or philosophizing consist of? Does he walk the walk of his talk? Are they similar and identical, the same things and merely expressions of the same things in different mediums? (shrink)

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff was one of the most prominent German philologists of his time and his work is still well regarded. This book, originally published in 1893, is a detailed analysis of the The Constitution of the Athenians, then usually regarded as a work of Aristotle. Wilamowitz accepts Aristotle's authorship of the famous treatise on the history of the constitution that restored democracy after the oligarchy of the Thirty. Volume 2 reconstructs Athenian constitutional history on the basis of the (...) work. A number of essays addressing topics on Athenian constitutional history and drawing on such figures as Solon, Peisistratus, Lysias and Isocrates are also included. (shrink)

Form follows function, but it does not follow from function. Form is not derivable from the latter. To realize a desired technical function, a form must first be found that is able to realize it at all. Secondly, the question arises as to whether an envisaged form realizes the function in an appropriate way. Functions are multiply realizable—various different forms can bear the very same function. One needs to find a form of a technical artifact that realizes an envisaged function (...) sufficiently efficient, robust, or whatever criteria might be imposed. This paper scrutinizes biomimetics as one way to find a good solution to the realization problem. Drawing on an approach from the philosophy of simulations, it reconstructs the biomimetic relation as being mediated by a theoretical model. It is shown that the robustness of the functioning system is usually reached in different ways in biological and in technological systems, which explains differences in morphogenetic mechanisms or principles found in these fields. This reconstruction helps to understand problems with robustness in synthetic biology that occur when technical design principles are implemented in a biological system. The mimetic relation between the biological and the technical realm is found to be asymmetric. (shrink)

I intended to deal with the different sections or chapters in one volume,‭ ‬but as certain sections or chapters are very long,‭ ‬like chapter‭ ‬1,‭ ‬THEORIZING AND PHILOSOPHIZING‭ (‬VOLUME‭ ‬1‭)‬,‭ ‬I divided some of them into separate volumes,‭ ‬chapter‭ ‬2‭ ‬HEURISTICS AND PROBLEMSOLVING‭ (‬Volume‭ ‬2‭) ‬and‭ ‬chapter‭ ‬3‭ ‬IMAGINARY EXPERIMENTS AND METAPHORS‭ (‬Vol‭ ‬3‭)‬. -/- In Volume‭ ‬1‭ ‬THEORIZING AND PHILOSOPHIZING‭ (‬VOLUME‭ ‬1‭) ‬I show that and how‭ (‬the different features,‭ ‬steps and stages of‭) ‬philosophizing resemble the processes of theorizing. (...) -/- I deal with a number of basic approaches that philosophers employ to do philosophy.‭ ‬These approaches form part of the traditional methodologies of all Philosophy. -/- The processes and techniques of doing philosophy resemble the techniques and methods one finds in different steps,‭ ‬stages and features of the processes of theorizing,‭ ‬theory development and construction.‭ ‬As many philosophers lack meta-cognitive awareness of what they are doing‭ (‬namely theorizing‭) ‬and how they are doing it‭ (‬the techniques of the different steps and stages of theorizing‭) ‬they do not complete the entire process of theorizing and theory development,‭ ‬but instead concentrate on only certain features of it. -/- The different features,‭ ‬steps and stages of theorizing are explained and the doing of philosophy is compared with them. (shrink)

LOGIC‭ & ‬ARGUMENTATION‭ (‬VOLUME‭ ‬5) The first section deals with different ways,‭ ‬approaches or methods of the doing of philosophy or the methodology of philosophizing or the discourse and socio-cultural practice of the Western tradition of philosophy. -/- I then insert a number of articles and post concerning the fact that Philosophy in the Western World concentrates on the History of the Western Tradition of philosophical ideas,‭ ‬complaints that it is white,‭ ‬male and Euro-centered and that it has become too (...) academic,‭ ‬professional and institutionalized. -/- The subsequent sections deal with the topics of Logic and a number of notions‭ ‬related to‭ ‘‬logic‭’‬.‭ ‬The logic referred to are those that are relevant to philosophy or the doing of philosophizing.‭ ‬Truth,‭ ‬meaning,‭ ‬arguments and argumentation are then dealt with.‭ ‬This leads to another section on logic and finally reasoning is mentioned as the coming together of most of the previous sections. -/- If you wish to think and write about multi-dimensional things like the‭ ‘‬world‭’‬,‭ ‬embodied persons,‭ ‬consciousness,‭ ‬human thinking etc,‭ ‬you should at least think multi-dimensional and many levelled.‭ ‬Attempting to investigate,‭ ‬reflect on and‭ ‬describe the nature and functioning of these multi-dimensional,‭ ‬many-levelled‭ ‬entities in a one-dimensional,‭ ‬verbal,‭ ‬linear manner surely is irrational and do not make sense‭? ‬Visual Argument Mapping is one of these multi-dimensional,‭ ‬many-levelled tools.‭ (‬See Appendix‭). (shrink)

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff was one of the most prominent German philologists of his time and his work is still well regarded. This book, originally published in 1893, is a detailed analysis of the The Constitution of the Athenians, then usually regarded as a work of Aristotle. Wilamowitz accepts Aristotle's authorship of the famous treatise on the history of the constitution that restored democracy after the oligarchy of the Thirty. Volume 1 investigates the historical sources employed by Aristotle, hypothesising that (...) he was using two now lost works in addition to Herodotus and Thucydides, and that these were likely to be chronicles of events in the city. Volume 2 reconstructs Athenian constitutional history on the basis of the work. A number of essays addressing topics on Athenian constitutional history and drawing on such figures as Solon, Peisistratus, Lysias and Isocrates are also included. (shrink)

Superficially, the proximity of Wittgenstein's work and its undisputed influence by Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas and concepts suggests that there are also overlaps in the large and in Nietzsche's work decisive field of progress and criticism of progress. The article tries to show that this is not the case. Despite all the overlaps that may exist between Friedrich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein, these do not come to light in the concept of progress and the critique of progress. Both thinkers pursue a (...) very different movement of thought; Wittgenstein sees Nietzsche's focus on the "idea of great progress" as a "delusion", which he does not consider to be expedient. Ludwig Wittgenstein explicitly distances himself here from the spirit that defined the prevailing European and American civilization in the 1930s. He does not succumb to the delusions of grandeur of new, higher-level civilization, but leaves progress as the constantly progressing background noise of any civilization. (shrink)

The gesture-as-simulated-action framework explains the occurrence of iconic gestures. Accordingly, simulated visual imagery gives rise to observer-viewpoint, whereas simulated motor imagery gives rise to character-viewpoint gestures. Because little is known about whether this relationship is either the product of becoming a competent speaker in different communicative tasks or exists from an early age, we investigated 4-year-olds. In the first session, 55 children performed three different communicative tasks. In the second session, we administered a SON-R non-verbal intelligence test to assess children’s (...) cognitive abilities. Results revealed a strong association between the frequency with which children used observer-viewpoints gestures and their scores in visual processing abilities. Because the association between gestures and visuospatial cognitive abilities was found across three communicative tasks, we can propose that it is a general ability rather than a phenomenon of task-specific discourse competence. We discuss these findings in terms of gestural threshold and cognitive offloading. (shrink)

In recent years, historians have rediscovered the religious dimensions of the Enlightenment. This volume offers a thorough reappraisal of the so-called “Catholic Enlightenment” as a transnational Enlightenment movement. This Catholic Enlightenment was at once ultramontane and conciliarist, sometimes moderate but often surprisingly radical, with participants active throughout Europe in universities, seminaries, salons, and the periodical press._ In _Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe: A Transnational History_, the contributors, primarily European scholars, provide intellectual biographies of twenty Catholic Enlightenment figures across eighteenth-century Europe, (...) many of them little known in English-language scholarship on the Enlightenment and pre-revolutionary eras. These figures represent not only familiar French intellectuals of the Catholic Enlightenment but also Iberian, Italian, English, Polish, and German thinkers. The essays focus on the intellectual and cultural factors influencing the lives and works of their subjects, revealing the often global networks of intellectual sociability and reading that united them both to the Catholic Enlightenment and to eighteenth-century policies and projects. The volume, whose purpose is to advance the understanding of a transnational "Catholic Enlightenment," will be a reliable reference for historians, theologians, and scholars working in religious studies. "This is a compelling collection on an important subject. Its transnational and biographical approach helps one to see eighteenth-century Catholicism and the Enlightenment itself in fresh and interesting ways." — Darrin M. McMahon, Florida State University_. (shrink)

The tools employed might appear appropriate, the reasoning sound and argumentation valid, but the subject-matter, well one wonders what that has to do with philosophy, if anything at all? Viewing some of the topics one really wonders of the notion of philosophy is not stretched too far? So much that is passed off as philosophy itself or some kind of so-called interdisciplinary issues really appear as irrelevant. Topics from the grievance studies especially fall under this. It seems as if individuals (...) have personal issues, obsessions and psychological, social and cultural problems that they attempt to interpret, perceive and treat as if they are philosophical and/or philosophically related. I wish to suggest that those issues are treated as disciplines or subjects in their own right, for example racism, feminism and gender studies, but not as if they have anything to do with philosophy or should be treated in a philosophical manner. As if they inform us about profound philosophical issues or concerns. Perhaps aspects of them can be dealt with as psychological, anthropological, sociological, biological, political, etc, but dealing with them as if they provide us with some kind of profound philosophical ideas and insights might be stretching the notion of philosophy a bit too far. I’ve wondered about the seeming dichotomy of materialism/physicalism and panpsychism and if they are really the only possible consciousness explanatory positions? How about biologism? That is as if all living biological matter or organisms are conscious, as well as that consciousness (the many types of it) can be explained best by the nature of those phenomena. A biologically restricted form or modification of pan-psychism? Part II What is Philosophy by Philosophers a Compilation. (shrink)

Coming from anarchist circles and revolutionary-syndicalist trade unions, Simone Weil initially saw herself as a Marxist and an anarchist, before increasingly becoming their early and extremely pointed critic. From 1933 on, she distanced herself more and more from the syndicalist movement in terms of content, and at the same time she was increasingly skeptical of its politics. She saw in the syndicalists, socialists, and communists no more accurate knowledge of society than in the conservatives or fascists. Moreover, she came to (...) realize that they did not have the necessary means of action to carry out a revolution. In the assertion of the "historical mission of the working class," she saw a phrase that served the functionaries but only further humiliated and betrayed the working class. In this respect, even Marxism was for Weil still the intellectual expression of the bourgeoisie, because even a change in property relations would not have eliminated the oppression of the working class. Until the end of her life, she held that instead a radical change in labor relations was necessary to end the oppression of the working class and its social misery. The article attempts to situate Simone Weil's early disillusionment with syndicalism, socialism, Marxism and Stalinism, as well as her recognition of what was widely labelled totalitarianism in Western societies at the latest after the Second World War, in her writings. (shrink)